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Finding an optimal subset of nodes in a network that is able to dis-
rupt the functioning of a corrupt or criminal organization or contain
an epidemic or the spread of misinformation is still one of the open
problems in modern network science. In this paper, we introduce the
generalized network dismantling problem, which aims at finding a
minimum set of nodes that, when removed from a network, results in
the fragmentation of a network into subcritical network components
at minimum cost. Contrary to previous formulations, we allow the
costs for node removal to take arbitrary non-negative real value. For
unit costs, our formulation becomes equivalent to the standard net-
work dismantling problem. Our non-unit cost generalization allows
one to consider topological cost functions related to node centrality
or non-topological features such as the price or protection level of
a node. In order to solve this optimization problem, we propose a
method, which is based on the spectral properties of a novel node-
weighted Laplacian operator. The proposed method is applicable to
large-scale networks with millions of nodes. It outperforms current
state-of-the-art methods and opens new directions for understand-
ing the vulnerability and robustness of complex systems.
complex systems | robustness | network fragmentation
In a hyper-connected world, systemic instability, based oncascading effects, can seriously undermine the functionality
of a network(1). The quick global spread of rumors and fake
news may be seen as recent examples (2–4), while the spread
of epidemics (5–7) or failure propagation (8–10) is a problem
that has been around much longer. Furthermore, it is known
that the network structure, for example the exponent charac-
terizing scale-free networks, is of particular importance for the
controllability of cascading effects (11). For certain scaling
exponents of scale-free network, the variance or mean value of
relevant quantities may not be well-defined, which means that
unpredictable or uncontrollable behavior may result. It may
then be impossible to contain epidemic spreading processes.
Similar circumstances may make it impossible to contain the
spread of computer viruses or misinformation—a problem that
is not only relevant for the quick increase of cyberthreats,
but may also undermine the functionality of markets, societal
or political institutions. At the same time, the removal or
deactivation of even a small set of collective influential nodes
can dismantle the network into isolated subcomponents and
thus disrupt the malfunctioning of a system. For example,
scale-free networks (12, 13) are more robust to random re-
movals than Erdős–Rényi network (14, 15), but at the same
time more vulnerable to targeted attacks (16–22).
However, finding a minimum set of nodes, the removal of
which is able to dismantle a network (23, 24) into isolated
subcomponents of specific small size belongs to class of hard
computational problems, called non-deterministic polynomial
hard (NP-hard) problems. Essentially, this implies that there
currently exists no efficient algorithm that can find the best
dismantling solution for large-scale structures. However, this
does not exclude finding approximate dismantling solutions.
For example, novel approximations (23–30), based on spin-
glass and optimal percolation theory, have been proposed. But
still, all these methods make the implicit assumption that the
cost of removing nodes is constant. Only recently, the effect of
costs depending on the node degree was studied (31, 32), but
restricted to random network structures (31) or edge-based
strategies (32) that take the degree-based cost into account.
This paper addresses the question of how to select the set
of nodes in a network, that, when removed or (de)activated,
can stop the spread of (dis)information, or an epidemic or
disrupt the functioning of a malicious systems by fragmenting
it into small components with minimal cost. In the generalized
network dismantling problem, the cost of removing a node
can be an arbitrary non-negative real number, which can, for
example, be specified as a function of node centrality properties
(33) such as degree, PageRank, betweenness or other variables
unrelated to network topology. Examples of variables that
may determine the cost of removing a node include: the
monetary price for buying or controlling a node, the protection
level or the energy effort. In this paper, we reformulate the
Laplacian spectral partitioning (34, 35), which dates back
to 1973 and since then was primarily used for edge removal
strategies on networks. We then construct a special node–
weighted Laplacian operator, which serves to determine the
upper bound of the cost of the generalized network dismantling
problem. Furthermore, we propose an elegant and efficient
approximation algorithm for the problem, which is applicable
to large-scale networks. Finally, a fine-tunning mechanism is
introduced by mapping the spectral solution to the weighted
vertex cover problem (36) from graph theory. Understanding
the key relationships between dismantling solutions and their
cost(s) enables one to increase the level of robustness of real-
world systems.
Significance Statement
The functioning of many socio-technical systems depends on
the ability of its subcomponents or nodes to communicate or
interact via its connections. By removing or deactivating a spe-
cific set of nodes, a network structure can be dismantled into
isolated subcomponents, thereby disrupting the malfunction-
ing of a system or containing the spread of misinformation or
an epidemic. We propose a generalized network dismantling
framework, which can take realistic removal costs into account
such as the node price, protection level or removal energy. We
discuss applications of cost-efficient dismantling strategies to
real-world problems such as epidemic spread or criminal and
corruption networks.
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Fig. 1. (a) Network dismantling measured by the size of the giant connected component (GCC) with respect to the degree-based definition of the cost for three different
strategies: state-of-the-art Min-Sum (23), random removal (37) (site percolation), our GND strategy. Dismantling represents the controlled process of suppressing the spread of
misinformation, computer viruses or other harmful contagion effects on a online social network (Petster-hamster (38)). The Min-Sum algorithm was set to dismantle the network
up to a fixed target size of 80 percent of the network GCC size. The cost of removing a node is proportional to the current degree of a node and the cost of the dismantling is
measured with the fraction of removed edges adjacent to the removed nodes. We observe that, for the same dismantling cost 0.4, the Min-Sum algorithm produces results (red
color) which are 5 % worse than the naive random removal (green color) of nodes in a network. However, for the same cost the proposed GND strategy (blue color) fragments
the network up to 62 % GCC size, which is 18 % better than the Min-Sum strategy. (b,c,d) Online social network (Petster-hamster (38)) displaying the set of removed nodes
according to the Min-Sum (red color), random removal (green color), and our GND strategy (blue color). Although the Min-Sum strategy removes a small percentage of nodes,
the cost is rather high as it targets high degree nodes, which is visible from the histogram of the removed nodes. In contrast, the GND strategy avoids the expensive removal of
hubs in this scenario and produce a much better fragmentation.
Main Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are listed below:
(i) We introduce a generalized network dismantling problem,
which seeks to find a set of nodes that, when removed
from a network, results in a network fragmentation into
components of subcritical size at minimum cost. Contrary
to the previous formulations (23–30), assuming identical
costs for the removal of each node, we allow for costs that
have arbitrary non-negative real values.
(ii) We formulate a novel node-weighted graph-cut objective
function, which determines the upper bound for the gen-
eralized network dismantling cost. We find the analytical
solution for the relaxed objective function, which is related
to the spectral properties of the node-weighted Laplacian
matrix.
(iii) To dismantle large-scale networks, we propose an efficient
spectral approximation by constructing a Power Lapla-
cian operator, which has complexity O(n · log2+(n)). Fur-
thermore, we provide analytical bounds and convergence
proofs for the spectral approximation. Finally, we propose
a fine-tuning mechanism by mapping the problem to the
weighted vertex cover problem.
(iv) We show that, on real networks, our approach outper-
forms current state-of-the-art methods (23, 24, 26, 28, 29)
for non-unit costs. In unit cost scenario, our approach per-
forms either better or comparably to other state-of-the-art
methods.
Generalized network dismantling problem
Let us define a network G(V,E) as the set of nodes, V , which
are connected via a set of edges, E. A set S is called a
C-dismantling set, if the largest connected component of a
network contains at most C nodes (23, 39). Finding the C-
dismantling set is a NP-hard problem. Current state-of-the-art
methods (23, 24, 26, 28, 29) make the implicit assumption
that the cost of node removal is the same for all nodes in
a network, regardless of their importance. Here thus, we
generalize the network dismantling problem in such a way that
the cost of removing a node i can be an arbitrary non-negative
number wi ∈ R instead of a unit value. More formally, for a
given network G(V,E), we want to find the subset of nodes
S ⊆ V with the minimum cost of removal, which will result
in fragmentation into components of size C. Depending on
the system of interest, the cost wi could represent the amount
of energy needed to remove a node, monetary cost of buying
or controlling a node, or some other network measure such as
the node importance or influence. The presented methodology
works for arbitrary non-negative weights, but in the absence of
other information, here we use the node degree as a proxy for
node importance and the associated removal cost. Note that,
in case of unit costs, the problem becomes equivalent to the
standard network dismantling problem (23, 24, 26, 28, 29).
Node-weighted spectral cut. Let us assume that we want to
partition the network G = (V,E) in such a way that the nodes
from a set M ⊆ V are not connected to the nodes from the
complementary set M = V \M . Whether a node i belongs to
the set M is represented by the following vector v ∈ Rn:
vi :=
{
+1 i ∈M,
−1 otherwise. [1]
The classical spectral bisection of a graph aims to minimize the
number of edges that has to be removed between the clusters
M and M . In this paper we propose a novel node–weighted
spectral cut objective function, where the cost of cutting the
edge (i, j) is equivalent to the cost of removing nodes i and j.
Then the upper bound for the cost of removing a subset
of nodes that are adjacent to the edges separating clusters M
and M is:
1
2
∑
i,j
−12 (vivj − 1)Ai,j (wi + wj − 1) , [2]
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where the matrix A denotes the adjacency matrix of the net-
work. Therefore, if the edge (i, j) connects nodes from different
clusters, the associated cost is wi + wj − 1, as vivj = −1 and
Ai,j = 1. In contrast, if the edge (i, j) connects nodes from
the same cluster (vivj = 1), the associated cost is zero, as this
link is not removed. Without loss of generality (see SI section
1 for more details), we assume that the proxy for the weight
is proportional to the degree centrality wi ∝ di. The term
(wi + wj − 1) contains the constant element−1 in order to lead
to a more elegant notation. Additionally, it corrects for double
counting of links that connects i and j. Now, we define the ma-
trix B by the elements Bi,j = Ai,j (wi + wj − 1), and define
the node-weighted Laplacian of the matrix B = AW+WA−A
by Lw = DB−B. In matrix notation the optimization problem
can be written as:
min 14v
TLwv [3]
subject to
1T v = 0, [4]
vi ∈ {+1,−1} , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . [5]
Matrices W and DB are diagonal matrices with the elements
Wii = di and (DB)ii =
∑n
j=1Bij . For more details about the
objective function see section 1 of the SI.
When the weight matrix equals the identity matrix (W =
I), we get the unweighted Laplacian, which corresponds to
the classical bisection problem (34, 35, 40). The additional
constraint 1T v = 0 enforces that clusters are of the same
size. Unfortunately, the optimization problem is NP-hard.
Therefore, we follow the standard relaxation (34) from the
integer constraint vi ∈ {+1,−1} to vi ∈ R. The solution to
this relaxed constrained minimization problem is, according to
the Courant-Fisher theorem, analytically given by the second
smallest eigenvector of the node–weighted Laplacian λ2v(2) =
Lwv
(2). A more detailed derivation of this solution is presented
in section 1 of the SI. If we remove all the nodes i whose
corresponding element in the second smallest eigenvector is
non-negative (v(2)i >= 0) and has a neighbor j with a negative
entry (v(2)j < 0), the network will fragment into two sub-
networks M and M¯ . Note that we can make a fine-tuning of
the spectral approximation solution, which will be described
later. Recursively, the node–weighted spectral cut is applied
to M and M¯ until the network is sufficiently fragmented into
small subnetworks of maximum size C.
Spectral approximation. In order to find the second smallest
eigenvectors for large-scale networks, we propose the following
simple and elegant approximation algorithm. Note that the Lw
is a real, symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix. Then, it
has real non-negative eigenvalues λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λn with the
eigenvectors v(1), ..., v(n), which form an orthonormal basis
of Rn. In section 2 of the SI, we show that 0 = λ1 and
λn ≤ 6 · d2max, where dmax is the maximum degree of any
node of the network. Furthermore, in section 2 of the SI,
we also give spectral bound for general non-negative weights
λn ≤ 4dmax(wmax + 1), where wmax is the maximum cost. So,
in order to compute v(2), we consider the matrix L˜ = 6 ·d2max ·
I − Lw, which has the same eigenvectors v(1), ..., v(n) as Lw.
Now the corresponding eigenvalues are shifted such that λ˜1 =
6 · d2max ≥ ... ≥ λ˜n = 6 · d2max − λn ≥ 0. Let v(1) correspond
to the eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue and v(2) to
the eigenvector with the second largest eigenvalue. Then,
Node weighted 
Laplacian matrix
Spectral approximation = apply linear 
operator to random vector Fine -tuning of spectral solution
B= + − =  −= 1 ⋯ 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 ⋯
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(2)
= 6 Ι-=  (3)(4)
(1)
+
< 0
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the proposed GND method for generalized network
dismantling. (1) The input network is defined by the adjacency matrixA. The costs for
node removals are represented by the diagonal matrix W and visualized by different
node sizes in the network. (2) Construction of the cost-weighted network defined
by the adjacency matrix B and it’s corresponding node weighted Laplacian Lw . (3)
Construction of the Power Laplacian operator L˜k , which is applied to the random
vector v′ on an n-dimensional sphere that is perpendicular to the first eigenvector
v1 = (1, 1, ...., 1). The result gives an approximate solution to the generalized
network dismantling into two components {i : vi < 0} and {i : vi ≥ 0}. The
operator L˜k is constructed from the node–weighted Laplacian (LW ) and the scaled
identity matrix I with the maximal degree of a node in the network, dmax. (4) Fine-
tuning of the spectral solution is done with the weighted vertex cover on the subgraph
of nodes that contains edges between components (represented in black and red).
The solution of the fine-tunning is a subset of nodes represented in red.
we find the eigenvector of Lw associated with the eigenvalue
λ2 via the following steps: (i) start with a random vector v
uniformly drawn from the unit sphere Sn, (ii) force it to be
perpendicular to the first eigenvector v1 = (1, ..., 1)T of the
weighted Laplacian Lw and (iii) apply the linear operator L˜k
with unit normalization to our vector v. The pseudo-code of
this spectral approximation is:
1. Draw v randomly from a uniform distribution on the unit
sphere.
2. Set v = v − vT1 v
vT1 v1
· v1.
3. For i = 1 to k = η(n), set
v = L˜v‖L˜v‖ .
The intuition that the random vector v converges exponen-
tially to some eigenvector of Lw with eigenvalue λ2 is closely
related to the spectral properties of operator L˜k. Note that
we can represent our random vector v in the orthonormal
eigenvector basis as v =
∑n
i=1 ψiv
(i). The second step of
orthogonalization ensures ψ1 = 0 and ψ2 6= 0 (almost surely).
Finally, by applying the linear operator L˜k to vector v we get:
L˜kv =
n∑
i=2
ψiλ˜i
k
v(i) ∝ ψ2v(2) +
n∑
i=3
ψi
(
λ˜i
λ˜2
)k
v(i). [6]
When λ3 > λ2 we have | λ˜iλ˜2 | < 1,
(
λ˜i
λ˜2
)k
ψivi → 0 with
exponential speed. The expected value of vector v converges
to some eigenvector of Lw with eigenvalue λ2:
E
[
|λ2 − v
TLwv
vT v
|
]
→ 0, [7]
when the power k of operator L˜ scales as O(log(n)1+) for
every real number  > 0, where n is the size of the network.
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Fig. 3. Dismantling of criminal and corruption networks, creation of firewalls to stop the spread of misinformation or malicious software or viruses in online networks. Specifically,
we show the size of the GCC versus the overall dismantling cost for four different networks: (a) crime network (41), (b) corruption network (42), (c) information network (Political
Blogs - PB) (43) and (d) online social network (Pokec - PK) (44). In this example, the cost of removing a node is assumed to be proportional to its current degree. The
dismantling cost is measured as the fraction of removed edges adjacent to the removed nodes. The network fragmentation was measured for a fixed realistic size from 0.5 to
1.0 (partial dismantling). The results show that our GND and GNDR strategies significantly outperform current state-of-the-art strategies. On the Pokec network with 1.63 ∗ 106
nodes and 2.23 ∗ 107 edges, we only compare our methods with Min-Sum, BPD and CoreHD methods, due to the scalability issues of other methods.
If λ2 = λ3 = ... = λk < λk+1, this sequence converges to
a unit length linear combination of v2, ..., vk, and is therefore
a vector which still minimizes vTLwv
vT v
among all vectors, that
are orthogonal to v1. Formal proofs for the convergence and
bounds are given in section 3 of the SI.
The computational complexity of recursively applying this
procedure to smaller and smaller partitions is O(n·η(n)·log(n))
for sparse networks. Due to the fast convergence, one can
expect asymptotically good partitions when η(n) = log(n)1+
and  > 0, which finally ends in the complexity of O(n ·
log2+(n)) for sparse networks. Further details about the
asymptotic complexity are given in section 4 of the SI.
Fine-tuning of the spectral solution. Let us denote with E∗
the set of separating edges that connect nodes from the set
{vi ≥ 0} to the set {vi < 0}. The set of nodes that are adjacent
to the separating set E∗ is denoted by V ∗. We can optimize
the solution by finding a set of nodes which covers all the
edges in E∗ with minimal cost. This is the weighted vertex
cover problem (36) on the graph G∗ = (V ∗, E∗) with weights
wi =
∑
j
Ai,j , according to the degrees in the original network
G = (V,E). This subproblem is also an NP-hard problem.
However there exists a 2-approximation efficient solution (36)
for it. Therefore, the cost of the approximate solution for the
subproblem is, at most, two times the cost of the optimal fine-
tuning. Further details about the fine-tuning approximation
are provided in section 5 of the SI. A general overview of
our proposed method is given in Fig. 2, to which we refer
as the GND method in the rest of the paper. At last, as the
proposed GND method is offering a recursive solution, some of
the nodes from early stages of fragmentation do not contribute
to the final stage of complete fragmentation. Therefore, in
order to produce better dismantling solutions (GNDR) for the
complete fragmentation, we reduce some of the nodes from
the final dismantling set. More details are provided in section
6 of the SI.
Results
In order to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed gen-
eralized network dismantling framework to a realistic scenario,
we apply it to the real-world networks and show that the
current state-of-the-art dismantling strategy (26) delivers dif-
ferent results from the non-unit cost definition, as expected.
We make the following two realistic assumptions: (i) the cost
of removing a node is not constant, but proportional to the
importance of the node, measured here by its current degree,
and (ii) we focus on the partial dismantling of the system’s
giant connected component (GCC). The first assumption that
the cost of removing a node is non-unit was already motivated
in this paper before. The second assumption reflects the fact
that, in practical applications, a partial dismantling of the
system size to say, 80 %, 50 %, or 1 % of the original GCC size
is more realistic than the complete dismantling, as the budget
is usually limited such that only a partial dismantling is possi-
ble. The degree-based cost of the dismantling is measured by
the number of removed edges adjacent to the removed nodes,
which is normalized with the total number of edges in the
network. In the case of unit-costs, the cost of the dismantling
is the fraction of the removed nodes as compared to the total
number of nodes in the network.
In Fig 1, we show the results of the network dismantling,
which represent suppressing the spread of misinformation,
computer viruses or other harmful contagion process on the
online social network (Petster-hamster (38)). The cost for
the 80 % partial dismantling with the state-of-the-art Min-
Sum strategy (26) is 0.4. However, although the Min-Sum
algorithm removes only 5 % of nodes in this process, its cost is
rather large. The reason for this high cost becomes clear if we
study the degree distribution of the removed nodes in Fig. 1b,
where we notice that all large hubs are removed. In contrast,
the random removal of nodes, also known as site percolation
process, with the same cost of 0.4 achieves fragmentation to
approximately 75 % of the original GCC size. This implies that
the current state-of-the-art strategy becomes very inefficient
when the non-unit cost is taken into consideration. Finally,
with the same cost of 0.4, our GND method fragments the
network to 62 % of the original GCC size, and for the target
of 80 % of the GCC size, the corresponding cost is only 0.2.
Next, we study the partial dismantling up to 50 % of the
GCC size on four different real-world networks for five different
state-of-the-art methods: Equal Graph Partitioning (EGP)
(45), Collective Influence (CI) (24), Min-Sum (23), CoreHD
(26) and Belief Propagation-guided Decimation (BPD) (27).
4 | Ren et al.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(a) Dismantling cost (degree-based)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(b) Dismantling cost (unit costs)
EGP
CI
Min-Sum
CoreHD
BPD
GND
GNDR
GC
C 
Siz
e
GC
C 
Siz
e
0.8 10 0.2 0.30.10 0.40.40.2 0.6
Fig. 4. Dismantling represents the controlled process of suppressing the spread of
misinformation, computer viruses or other harmful contagion processes on the online
social network (Petster-hamster (38)). Size of the GCC versus the dismantling cost
for complete dismantling (target size 0.01). The cost of removing a node is: (a)
proportional to the current degree of a node or (b) equal for all nodes (unit costs). We
observe that even for unit costs and complete dismantling the presented methodology
(GNDR) provides good solutions.
The real-world networks include: (i) crime network with 754
nodes obtained by the projection of a bipartite network of
persons and crimes (41); (ii) corruption network (42) with 309
nodes; (iii) information network of political blogs (PB) (43)
with 1222 nodes and 16714 edges; and (iv) large online social
network (Pokec) (44) with 1.63 ∗ 106 nodes and 2.23 ∗ 107
edges. In a case of malfunction, the dismantling of these
networks can enable efficient immunization strategies against
harmful contagion by engineered breaking points in criminal
or corruption networks, or by firewalls to stop the spread
of misinformation and malicious cyber data. In Fig. 3, the
results show that, for the partial dismantling to 50 % of
the original GCC size, the proposed methodology (GND and
GNDR) achieves the same fragmentation level with much
smaller cost: 0.03 (GNDR) vs. 0.1 (Min-Sum) for the crime
network, 0.14 (GNDR) vs. 0.19 (Min-Sum) for the corruption
network, 0.55 (GND) vs. 0.65 (EGP) for the information
network and 0.69 (GND) vs. 0.91 (Min-Sum) for the online
network. If we did the unit cost dismantling analysis, our
approach was still better or comparable to the other approaches
(see section 7 of the SI for more details). In Fig. 4, we
show the fragmentation curve for the complete dismantling
(approximately 1 % of the original GCC size) for different
weighting: (a) degree-based cost, and (b) unit costs. For unit
costs, our approaches provide better or comparable solutions.
In case the external information about the cost of removing
a node wi is available, we are able to incorporate it into
the matrix W and proceed with our GND method. Section
2 of the SI gives spectral bounds for general non-negative
weights, for which the same spectral approximation method
can be used. In Fig. 5, we show the results for the world
airport network, where the cost wi of closing an airport i is
assumed to be proportional to the total flux of the passengers
of the airport. In this example, we have set the target size
of the GCC of the network at 80% of the initial size. It
is interesting to observe that our GND method dismantles
the network with the cost of only 0.06 of the total weights,
which is significantly less than the cost of 0.25 incurred with
the Min-Sum method (23). In the same figure, we provide a
geographical visualization of the dismantling solution, where
the closed airports are represented by red dots with area
proportional to the dismantling cost. The world airport case
study shows the importance of considering realistic dismantling
costs, which dramatically changes the dismantling solutions. In
case of the world airport network, the closing of an airport can
represent quarantine. Correspondingly, the reduction of the
GCC size represents the containment effect for the pandemic
spread.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the generalized network disman-
tling problem, which seeks to find a set of nodes allowing to
dismantle a network into components of subcritical size in the
most cost-effective way. We do not make the assumption that
the cost of removing nodes is the same for all nodes (23–30).
We allow for costs to include non-topological properties re-
lated to the price or protection level. Our proposed method
is based on a blend of spectral properties of a novel node-
weighted Laplacian operator, randomized approximations and
weighted vertex cover approximations. We demonstrate that,
for the partial dismantling of networked systems, current state-
of-the-art methods do not produce near-optimal results and
sometimes behave even worse than the random baseline strat-
egy (site percolation method). Our study raises new questions
regarding the reorganization of current socio-technical systems
under different realistic costs in order to become more robust
against targeted attacks. We have demonstrated that the
dismantling can enable cost-effective immunization strategies
against harmful contagion effects in social and transportation
networks as well as the disruption of criminal and corruption
networks. Understanding the theory behind network disman-
tling opens new research directions and will enable us to design
more robust and resilient systems in future.
Ethics. The method presented in this paper aims at offering a
possible solution for emergencies where cutting a dysfunctional
network into pieces can restore the functionality. However, we
also warn of potential misuses or dual uses. When not applied
in appropriate contexts and ways, the use of the dismantling
approach may undermine the proper functionality of networks.
Therefore, we point out that related ethical issues must be
always sufficiently, appropriately, and transparently addressed
(46, 47) when the method is applied. The method must be
restricted to legitimate uses and actors. It may be justified
to stop harmful cascading problems such as deadly epidemics
and the spreading of disruptive computer malware, or to
dismantle criminal organizations or corruption networks. The
method may also be used to identify more resilient system
designs and network operations. Note, however, that the
use of dismantling strategies to contain misinformation can
be potentially problematic, as it may result in censorship
if a government, company, news agency or other institution
decides what is misinformation or not. Stopping the spread of
true information can seriously obstruct the societal evolution
towards better insights and solutions. (For example, if the
method had been misused by the established powers in the
past, we might still believe that the Earth is the center of
the universe.) Also note that, if public discourse is shaped
by a few people only, this may promote the misuse of power,
corruption and crime. In order to contain fake news, dis- and
misinformation, we recommend a suitable combination of the
use of AI, collective intelligence (such as Wikipedia and crowd-
sourced fact checking), reputation systems for messages and
information sources, elected community moderators, complaint
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Fig. 5. Comparison of our proposed GND algorithm with the Min-Sum algorithm for the world airport network. The cost of a node wi in this network is assumed to be given by
the total passenger flux of the airport. (a) Setting the target size of the GCC of the network to 80%, the Min-Sum algorithm (23) implies a cost of approximately 25 % of the total
passengers. In contrast to the Min-Sum algorithm, our GND method dismantles the network with the cost of only 6 % of the total passengers, which amounting to 19 % less for
the same target dismantling size. (b), (c), and (d) visualize the airports that will be closed for a target size of 80% of the GCC size using the Min-Sum algorithm (upper panel) or
the GND algorithm (lower panel) in Europe, North America, and Asia, respectively. Closed airports are represented by red dots with the area proportional to the cost.
mechanisms, qualification mechanisms, quality-based message
ranking and reach, as well as verification/measurement-based
approaches.
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